Mostly unnoticed in the recent flurry of world events, from the lightning fast seizure and extradition of Venezuelan dictator, Nicolas Maduro, by the United States (U.S.) in a 2-3 January 2026 overnight raid to the ongoing U.S. and Israeli takedown of the Iranian regime, was an important meeting in Istanbul, Turkey of leadership figures, branches, and networks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Many of these representatives came from Brotherhood groups in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, but others represented Brotherhood chapters based in Europe. Following the decades-long collaboration between the Brotherhood and Iran’s Khomeinists dating back to training under the KGB in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley in the late 1960s-early 1970s and culminating in the Iran-directed 9/11 attacks by Al-Qa’eda, the timing of the Brotherhood meeting in retrospect now seems somewhat prescient. As the major Shi’ite power of the region goes down to Operations Roaring Lions and Epic Fury, and the people of Iran rise up to take back their country and their freedom, the forces of Sunni jihad may see an opportunity.
Preceding the Istanbul meeting itself, on New Year’s Day, 1 January 2026, large pro-HAMAS rallies were held in Istanbul in support of populations in Gaza and to protest Israel’s post-October 7, 2023, operations against HAMAS, Gaza’s Brotherhood off-shoot there. Tens of thousands converged at Istanbul’s Galata Bridge. The rallies reportedly were attended by Turkish officials, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son, Bilal. The Erdogan regime has long been supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood and permissively allows HAMAS terror cells that attempt to launch attacks in Judea and Samaria to operate from its territory.
On 3 January 2026, delegations from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen, in addition to representatives from Turkey’s own Istanbul Front and the Brotherhood’s international office in London, met in a secretive closed-door session in Istanbul. The Muslim Brotherhood is a designated terrorist group in a number of these participating countries and others, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Additionally, on 24 November 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 14362 to begin the process of officially designating certain Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs). A White House Fact Sheet was issued the same day to explain the process, which directs Secretary of State, Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessent, in consultation with Attorney General Pam Bondi and Tulsi Gabbard, the Director of National Intelligence, to submit a report within 45 days.
In the face of such international pressure, exclusion, and a perceived loss of influence and presence across the region, but especially in areas of conflict like Gaza, the Istanbul meeting was intended to re-focus efforts and respective roles for the Brotherhood across the MENA region. Topics of discussion at the Istanbul meeting reportedly included how the Muslim Brotherhood should re-establish its presence and manage specific current conflict situations in Sudan and Yemen.
Escalating conflict in Yemen has been marked especially in the southern Hadramout region by 2-3 January 2026 Saudi airstrikes targeted at the UAE-backed Southern Transition Council (STC). The STC, formed in 2017, seeks to establish a breakaway Yemen “State of South Arabia,” while Saudi Arabia continues to back the internationally-recognized government of the Republic of Yemen. Mohammed Saleh Batees, the acting head of the STC’s Executive Authority in Hadramout, has issued warning statements about the possible returning influence of Al-Qa’eda, the Brotherhood, and the Iran-backed Houthis, which seized control of Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014. To resolve the dispute between rival Gulf powers Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both of which oppose the Houthis, a delegation led by STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi, had been due to travel to Saudi Arabia at Saudi invitation.
Similarly, in Sudan, the UAE reportedly has provided military support to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is engaged in conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has long supported the Sudanese Khartoum government in a relationship that goes back to the 1950s. As in Yemen, the widening split between the two is playing out across the region, as Saudi Arabia seeks to “maintain stability in the volatile region” – including a unified state for Yemen – while the UAE appears to be “pursuing access to resources and strategic geography” near the strategic Horn of Africa and Red Sea, according to reporting from the Africa Defense Forum. It’s important to note, however, that Saudi policy in Yemen does not imply any kind of Saudi shift towards the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned as a terrorist organization in the Kingdom.
Amidst this wider regional scenario, the Istanbul meeting would seem to have been seeking opportunistic advantage for Muslim Brotherhood territorial meddling arising out of earlier difficulties in the Gulf relationship between the Emiratis and Saudis. An STC delegation (although it seems without Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the leader of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council), did travel for talks to Saudi Arabia on 7 January, 2026, but now in the wake of Iranian regime drone and missile strikes that have hit both Saudi Arabia and the UAE as well as other Gulf states, they have come together to denounce those strikes and declare unity in opposing whatever’s left of the Iranian regime. These as-yet still unfolding developments do offer hope that Saudi-Emirati differences might be finding a solution, rather than providing a dangerous and unnecessary opening for the Muslim Brotherhood.
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Clare M. Lopez is the Founder/President of Lopez Liberty LLC and blogs at “In Defense of Liberty” at Newsmax.
The views expressed in CCNS member articles are not necessarily the views or positions of the entire CCNS. They are the views of the authors, who are members of the CCNS.
